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ABSTRACT 
This study is aimed to investigate the effect of corporate governance indicators such as the board of 
directors, audit committee and audit quality to the bank performance which is proxied by CAMEL 
ratio such as CAR, NPL, LDR, ROA, BOPO and ROE. The samples were 30 listed banks in the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was  used to test the influence of 
corporate governance indicators to the bank performance. The test results proved that the board of 
commissioners had a significant positive correlation to the bank performance. It means the higher the 
commissioners’ supervision, the better the performance of the bank. Similarly, the audit quality also 
has a significant positive correlation to the bank performance which means the higher the audit 
quality, the better the performance of the bank. It has also been revealed that the audit committee, 
although positively related to bank performance but it is not significantly proved. The results of this 
study are supported by some previous studies. 
 
Keywords:Corporate Governance, Performance Bank, CAMEL Ratio, the Board, the Audit 
Committee, and Audit Quality 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The banking industry has always been an object of interest to be investigated because it has two 
characteristics that distinguish it from other industries in general. First, as a regulation-intensive 
industries (highly regulated). Almost every side of the bank's activities can not be separated from the 
scope of regulation and monitoring of the resident agency standards or regulatory agencies, which in 
Indonesia is conducted by Bank Indonesia (BI). Many provisions governing banking business aims to 
protect the interests of the wider community. It is a consequence that is caused by the characteristics of 
the two banks. The banking industry is based on trust, especially the trust of its customers. 
People who become customers of bank put the funds held in the bank without a full guarantee of 
the bank, even with the rate of return set by the bank. In accordance with its role as an intermediary 
and drive of the economy, the funds collected will be re-routed by the bank in the form of other 
investments. In carrying out its activities, the bank faces a variety of risks such as credit risk, market 
risk, operational risk and legal risk. To that end, the bank needs to be managed with governance 
(corporategovernance) by both professional management and high integrity. Without good 
governance, the banking industry will probably experience a collapse as it did in 1997. 
It was preceded by a financial crisis in many countries in the 1997-1998. Financial crisis that began 
in Thailand in 1997 and  was followed by the crisis in Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong 
and Singapore which eventually turned into the Asian financial crisis. It is seen as a result of lack of 
practice of Good Corporate Governance (GCG). Among others, the close relationship between 
government and business, conglomeration and monopoly, protection, and market interventions that 
make these countries are not ready to enter the era of globalization and free market (Tjager et al., 
2003). 
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However, a mild condition for the establishment of banks has a negative impact and lead to an 
increase in the number of banks and banking which are fairly aggressive. This increase was colored 
with cross-ownership issue and management of cross in the financial industry. These two things are 
the cause of the increased concentration of ownership in the banking industry, so the greater the 
likelihood of violation of the legal lending limit to a group of its own company, the greater the impact 
in the banking sector. After going through a period of economic crisis, the number of commercial 
banks in Indonesia has decreased (from 237 banks in 1997 down to 130 banks in 2006, a drop of 
45.2%),  resulting from the freezing of 67 bank and 40 banks merged and acquisitions. The decrease is 
a result of the strict standards that must be met for the establishment of a bank, such as capital 
structure, mergers, acquisitions and bank closures due to financial problems. 
When observed from the background and the conditions,one of the main causes of the banking 
industry collapse experienced during the crisis is related to the poor management. Valuable lessons to 
be learned from the financial crisis faced by Indonesia are due to weak implementation of good 
corporate governance (GCG) in the banking industry. GCG implementation of the provisions on the 
bank aims to strengthen the internal banking system in facing of increasingly complex risks. 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) developed a set of corporate 
governance principles. The basic principles of good corporate governance include transparency, 
accountability, responsibility, independence, and fairness, which aim to ensure the survival and the 
growth of sustainable enterprises.  
One of the factors needed to create effective corporate governance, especially after the financial 
crisis in Asia, is the role of the board of commissioners. Macey and O'Hara (2003) states that the board 
has a very important role in a bank because of the difference of governance at banks with non-bank 
firms. The main reason for the difference is due to the importance of other stakeholders such as 
creditors’ banks and regulators. Bank directors should be responsible not only to shareholders, but also 
to depositors, customers, and regulators. 
Skully (2002 ) also stated that the role of the board is very important in the application of corporate 
governance since the passage of oversight by the board of commissioners will reduce the risk of 
taxpayer funds that can be used as a mitigation or to resolve a crisis. Implementation of good corporate 
governance can also play a role in controlling the lending practices on the part that still has a 
relationship with the bank. 
The studies that have been done previously on the effect of the application of corporate governance 
are mixed results on the relationship between the compositions of the board of management with the 
company's performance. Most studies find no effect or a significant relationship between the presence 
of the management board and the company's performance (Bhagat and Black,1999; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991). Eisenberg et al. (1998) found a negative relationship between board size and 
corporate performance. 
However, Rosentein and Wyatt (1990) showed a positive relationship between stock prices and the 
proportion of responses independent board. Large board size is more effective when compared to a 
small board size (Dalton et al, 1999; Nasution and Setiawan, 2007). According to Andres, Azofra and 
Lopez (2005) the number of board members greatly influences the control and supervision 
activities.Xieet. al. (2003) found that the audit committee is an important factor to management 
control. Number of audit committee members’ influences can be given to the company,the larger size 
of audit committees is expected to keep the bank in better performance. 
While the study examined the effect of audit committee members is independent of the 
performance of bank (Nasution and Setiawan, 2007; and Li et al., 2008). The results revealed that 
audit committee members have a positive effect on firm performance. The independent audit 
committee is expected to improve the company's performance. 
In carrying out the obligations and responsibilities regarding financial reporting system, the audit 
committee should hold meetings three to four times a year (FCGI, 2001). The more audit committee 
meetings conducted to improve the performance of the audit committee. The holding of regular 
meetings of the audit committee that is expected to improve the performance of the bank. 
Audit committee members have knowledge of auditing and financial reporting support to the 
external auditor in disputes with management. The audit committee members in resolving 
disagreements between management and the external auditors require the knowledge and expertise in 
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the field of accounting. The existence of a dispute between the parties management with external 
auditors may affect the performance of the company, so that the company is expected to perform well. 
The studies that examined the effect of audit quality on the performance of banks proves that the 
audit is a systematic process to obtain and evaluate the evidence objectively, related to assertions of 
economic measures to measure the level of concordance between assertions with established criteria 
and then communicating the results to the parties concerned. The results of the audit process are the 
auditor's report (auditopinion), which is a report on the fairness of financial statements in accordance 
with accounting principles generally accepted. 
Agency theory is the role of the external auditor as a control tool that can be used to eliminate or at 
least provide a signal on oportunistic practices or fraud committed by management as earnings 
management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Audit will reduce the 
information asymmetry between company management and stakeholders by allowing outsiders to 
verify the validity of the financial statements.  
Good audit quality should be able to detect fraud committed by management like earning 
management and reporting actual performance of companies that do not lie to investors. Firm size 
could be expected to affect the quality of the audit. Because of the size of a large accounting, firm 
usually will not take the risk in the financial performance of the audit client, and tend to report the 
actual performance of the company, as well as to encourage companies to actually improve the 
performance of its operations. Varying results of previous literature is caused by the endogenous 
relationship,i.e the things resulted from the company itself (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991), and 
causality (Kole, 1997) between board composition and corporate performance management. 
The inconclusive results make it quite interesting to study in Indonesia and should also research 
important factors that supported the GCG practices in the banking sector, especially affecting the 
performance of the bank. More specifically this study will use three important components in the 
characteristics of the GCG board, audit committee, and audit quality will be linked to the level of the 
banking performance which is measured by using five financial ratios included in the ratio of 
CAMEL. 
The problems in this study is to find out the effects of the bank's board of commissioners, the audit 
committee, the audit quality, and the corporate governance indicators towards the bank’s performance.  
 
2.THEORETICAL REVIEW 
2.1. Good Corporate Governance (GCG) 
Syakhroza (2003)  assumes that managers will act opportunistically by taking personal gain before 
the interest of shareholders. The agency theory arises because of the development of modern 
management science which shifts the classical theory, namely the rule that separates the owner of the 
company (principal) and the managers of the company (agent). As the company expanded, especially 
the more dispersed shareholders, the more agency cost incurred and the owner cannot exercise 
effective control of the managers who manage the company. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) potential conflicts of interest can occur between related 
parties such as between the shareholders of the company manager (agency costs of equity) or between 
shareholders and creditors (the agency costs of debt). According to their agency, cost includes three 
things, namely, monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss. Monitoring costs are an expense that 
is paid by the principal to measure, observe and control the behavior of agents in order not to deviate. 
These costs arise because of the imbalance of information between principal and agent. In certain 
situations, the principal allowing agents to spend company resources (bonding costs) to guarantee the 
agency will not harm him. However, there is a discrepancy between the agency decision-making and 
decisions that maximize welfare agency. Value of money is equivalent to reduction in welfare 
experienced by the principal is called residual loss. 
The agency theory is difficult to apply because of many obstacles.So we need a clearer concept on 
how to protect the stakeholders.The issues relating to conflicts of interest and cost-agency will arise, 
so it develops a new concept which pays attention and regulates the interests of the parties associated 
with the ownership and the operation of  stakeholders  of a company, which is known as the concept of 
corporate governance. 
 International Journal on Economics and Social Sciences 
Vol.1, No.1, January  2015, p. 25-30 
 
Copyright©Universitas Bandar Lampung 2015 
28 
According to FCGI (2001) notion of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) is a set of rules 
governing the relationship between shareholders, management companies, creditors, government, 
employees and internal stakeholders and other external relating to the rights and obligations or in the 
other words, a system that regulates and controls the company.  
According to Rahmawati et al (2006), GCG is defined as a set of rules and principles such as 
fairness, transparency, accountability, independency, and responsibility, which governs the 
relationship between the shareholders, the management, the company (directors and commissioners), 
creditors, employees and other stakeholders relating to the rights and obligations of each party. Based 
on the definition or understanding of GCG,  it can be concluded that a GCGis the system, processes, 
and a set of rules governing the relationship between the various interested parties (stakeholders). In 
the narrow sense, GCG is a relationship between the shareholders, the board of commissioners, and 
the board of directors for the achievement of corporate objectives. 
The purpose of GCG is to create benefit for all interested parties. Theoretically, the implementation 
of GCG to enhance corporate value, by improving their financial performance, which may reduce the 
risk undertaken by the board of commissioners with decisions that benefit themselves and generally 
GCG can increase investor confidence (Tjager et al., 2003). 
Darmawanti, Rahayu, and Khomsiyah (2004) stated that issue of Corporate Governance arises 
because there is a separation between the ownership and the management company (agency 
problems). The relationship between agency problems and capital owners in the management is the 
owner’s difficulty in ensuring that the funds are invested in profitable projects. 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) develops the corporate 
governance principles, which is known as the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance thatare: 
1. Transparency (disclosure of information), namely transparency in the decision-making process 
and openness in expressing material and relevant information about the company. 
2. Accountability (accountability), the clarity of function, structure, systems, and corporate 
accountability so that organs are effective enterprise management. 
3. Responsibility (accountability), i.econformity (compliance) in the management of the firm to the 
principles of healthy corporate and applicable legislation. 
4. Independency (autonomy), which is a state where a professionally managed company with no 
conflict of interest and influence or pressure from management that is not in accordance with 
regulations and legislation in force and the principles of healthy corporate. 
5. Fairness (equality and fairness), the fair and equal treatment in meeting stakeholder rights a rising 
under the agreement  and applicable legislation 
 The principles of corporate governance as described above are realized inthe management 
ofthe company attempted to implement the following matters: 
1. General Meeting of Shareholders 
2. Openness andTransparency 
3. Existence Independent Commissioner 
4. The size of the Board of Commissioners 
5. Audit Committee 
6. Ownership structure 
2.2. The Impact of Board of Commissioners on Bank Performance 
Surveillance system in the company is divided into two types, namely the system of “two-tier" 
system and the "one-tier". In the limited company that embraces organ systems company with "two-
tier" system board as well as in Indonesia, the company's general oversight role is performed by the 
board of commissioners, while the firm adherents of a "one-tier" system board, the supervisory 
functions is performed by organs known as boards of directors. 
The studies that have been done previously on the importance of the implementation of corporate 
governance, especially in the case studies conducted by other countries, used the term to describe the 
board of directors’ oversight function. One of the studies referenced in this research is research 
conducted by Pathanet al. (2007), which examines the size and independence of the board of directors 
and its influence on the performance of companies on a bank in Thailand. Thailand can be an area of 
research, which is quite good considering like Indonesia, in 1997 the country was also experiencing 
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severe financial crisis. In a study using a fixed effect panel models, it is known that there is a 
significant negative relationship between board sizes with the performance of banks in Thailand. This 
is consistent with the hypothesis that was made and showed that the size of the smaller board would be 
more effective in monitoring bank managers, while the board with a larger size are more prone to 
agencyproblems between the owner and the company that runs the operational company (manager). 
The second result obtained from the study was the discovery of positive relationship between board 
independence on the banks in Thailand and the bank's performance. This suggests that independent 
directors perform better in a monitor on the bank (especially in Thailand), as independent directors 
also have a market reputation that needs to be maintained. These studies suggest banks can improve 
their performance by reducing the number or size of the board and add a few boards that are more 
independent. 
Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) also found a negative relationship between board size with 
the performance of the company or bank. Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) show that the 
smaller board size would be more effective and can provide benefit because it is easier to coordinate in 
it.Large board size is more effective when compared to a small board size (Dalton et al, 1999; 
Nasution and Setiawan, 2007). According to Andres, Azofra and Lopez (2005), the number of board 
members influences and controls monitoring activities. The larger board size is expected to supervise 
the management better, so as to improve the performance of the bank or company. 
In line with this, Adams and Mehran (2003), and Belkhir (2005) state that, the U.S. Bank Holding 
Companies, found that the size of the board and its performance has a positive relationship. This study 
suggests that surveillance conducted by the board with a large number of members or more will have 
an advantage that will exceed the costs incurred. Thereby,positive relationship between board size and 
performance of the companies in the U.S can be explained due to mergers and acquisitions in the 
banking industry. 
2.3. The Impact of  Audit Committee on BankPerformance 
Another important component that supports the implementation of GCG is the audit committee 
(FCGI, 2001). In accordance with the Decision of the Chairman of Bapepam Number: 29/PM/2004, 
the audit committee is a committee established by the board of commissioners to carry out the task of 
supervision and management of the company. 
Xieet al. (2003) found that the audit committee is an important factor in the control of management. 
In that study, the average audit committee, which is owned by the sample companies,is 5 members in 
the range of 2 to 12 members. Number of audit committee members influences the level of influence 
that can be given to the company, the size of the larger audit committees are expected to keep the bank 
with better performance. 
While the study is examining the effect of independent audit committee members towards the 
performance of the company or bank by Nasution and Setiawan (2007) and Li et al. (2008). From the 
results of their study it is revealed that independent audit committee members have positive effect on 
firm performance. With the independent audit committee is expected to improve the company's 
performance. 
On the other hand, Alijoyo (2003) states that the audit committee must be transparent, must be in 
line with audit charter and annual programs of the audit committee which are then supported with 
regularity of audit committee meeting. In carrying out the obligations and responsibilities regarding 
financial reporting system, the audit committee should hold meetings three to four times a year (FCGI, 
2001). The more audit committee conducted a meeting, the more improvedof the performance of the 
audit committee. The holding of regular meetings of the audit committee that is expected to improve 
the performance of the bank. Audit committee members who have knowledge of auditing and 
financial reporting support to the external auditor. The knowledge and expertise in the fields of 
accounting and auditing is required by members of the audit committee in resolving disagreements 
between management and the external auditors. The existence of a dispute between the parties 
management with external auditors may affect the performance of the company. 
2.4. The Impact of  Audit Quality on BankPerformance 
Audit is a systematic process to obtain and evaluate the evidence objectively related to assertions 
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of economic measures to measure the level of correspondence between the assertions and established 
criteria, and to communicate the results to the parties concerned. The results of the audit process are 
the auditor's report (audit opinion), which is a report on the fairness of financial statements in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). 
In terms of agency theory, the role of the external auditor is as a control tool that can be used to 
eliminate or at least provide a signal on opportunistic practices or fraud committed by management as 
earnings management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Audit will reduce 
the information asymmetry between company management and stakeholders by allowing outsiders to 
verify the validity of the financial statements. The examined of nine studies and found that the audit 
reduces the positive bias of the earnings and net assets before audited. 
Good audit quality should be able to detect fraud committed by management like earnings 
management and reporting actual performance of companies that do not lie to investors. Firm size 
could be expected to affect the quality of the audit because of the size of a large accounting firm 
usually will not take the risk in the financial performance of the audit client, and tend to report the 
actual performance of the company, so as to encourage companies to actually improve the 
performance of its operations. 
Based on the analysis of previous studies, the hypothesis in this study is expressed as follows: 
H1 : The Board of Commissioners has an influence on the performance of the bank. 
H2 : The audit committee has an influence on the performance of the bank. 
H3 : Audit quality has an influence on the performance of the bank. 
3. METHOD 
To determine the effect of the independent variables, Board of Commissioners, the Audit 
Committee and Audit Quality Performance Bank on the dependent variable (CAR, NPL, LDR, 
ROA,and ROE) then set up a model of the Structural Equation Model(SEM) to test the hypothesis1 to 
hypothesis 3.  
Meanwhile, the measurement model in this study is using Confirmatory Factor Analysis(CFA) 
which indicates latent variable measured by one or more observed variables. Research model using 
CFA areas follows: 
Latent variables in this study are Board of Commissioners, the Audit Committee, Audit Quality, 
and Bank Performance. Board of commissioners is abbreviated to BC. This variableis measured using 
four indicators, namely: BC1, BC2, BC3, and BC4. Audit Committee, is abbreviated to AC. This 
variable was measured using the five indicators,  namely: AC1, AC2, AC3, AC4, andAC5. Audit 
quality, is abbreviated to AQ. This variable is measured using two indicators, namely: AQ1and AQ2. 
Performance of the Bank, is abbreviated to PB. This variable is measured using the five indicators, 
namely: PB1, PB2, PB3, PB4, and PB5. 
Variables observed in this study consisted of sixteen indicators consisting of: 
1. BC4 observed variables. BC1 measured using board size, BC2 measured using the proportion of in 
dependent directors, BC3 is measured by using a number of meetings of the board of 
commissioners, and BC4 measured using educational background commissioner. 
2. AC5 observed variables. AC1is measured by using the number of audit committee, AC2 measured 
using the proportion of independent audit committee, AC3 measured using the number of audit 
committee meetings, AC4 measured using audit committee members' experience working as an 
auditor, andAC5 was measured by using a background education audit committee. 
3. AQ2 observed variables. AQ1 is measured by using a dummy the size of the Public Accounting Firm 
conduct an audit of the banks that the sample in this study. If companies or banks audited by Big 4 
accounting firm (large) then the high audit quality, but if the bank is audited by non Big 4 
accounting firm (small) then the lower the audit quantity. AQ2 is measured by using a dummy of 
the audit opinion provided by the external auditor.  
The population was banks and the sample was randomly selected from the banks listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2009-2010. The data used in this study are obtained from anual reports 
and financial statements of the banks listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2009-2010. 
Data are sourced from the official website of IDX(www.idx.co.id), and the official website of each 
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company. Data on board and audit committee sourced from annual reports (annual report) that the 
sample banks in 2009-2010.While the ratio of data to measure the performance of the banking 
CAMEL sourced from financial statements (financial report) banks that were visited in 2009-2010. To 
test the SEM model (Hairetal., 1998), we evaluate the level off it of the data through several stages, 
namely: overall model fit, measurement model fit, and structural model fit. 
 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Based on the analysis of Table 1. the descriptive statistics for each variable in this study are as 
follows: 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
BC 1 30 3.000 8.000 4.000 2.5000 
BC 2 30 .667 .750 . 500 .6552 
BC 3 30 4.000 43.000 10.000 1.3607 
BC 4 30 .000 1.000 0.330 .48918 
AC 1 30 3.000 6.000 4.000 .38824 
AC 2 30 .000 .750 .500 .6801 
AC 3 30 2.000 16.000 13.000 7.8925 
AC 4 30 .000 .667 .330 .3423 
AC 5 30 .000 .667 .330 .2197 
AQ 1 30 .000 1.000 .700 .50855 
AQ 2 30 .000 1.000 .600 .49827 
Valid N (listwise) 30     
 
1. Average number of BC1 as measured by board size is 4 people. The minimum number is 3 people 
and maximum is 8 people. 
2. Average BC2 as measured by the proportion of independent directors is of 0.5. It means that the 
number of independent directors compared to the number of commissioners has the same 
proportions. The minimum proportion of BC2 is0.667, and the maximum proportion is0.75. 
3. Average BC3 as measured by the number of meetings of the BC is 10 timesa year and it is equal to 
the number of meetings required by the government, while the minimum meeting of 4 times 
means that banks only conduct meetings 4 times a year, and the maximum meetings  is 43 times 
means that there is a bank that held 43 meeting times a year. This is more than is required by the 
government. 
4. Average BC4 is measured using accounting educational background is 33%.It means that the 
members of the commissioners who have the accounting educational background are one third of 
the total number of commissioners. While minimum commissioners who have an accounting 
educational background is 0%. It means no member of the BC in the bank that has the accounting 
educational background. The maximum value of BC4is 1 means that each member of the board of 
commissioners in a bank which is a sample of accounting educational backgrounds. 
5. Average AC1 as measured using the number of audit committee is at 4.00 means that on average 
most of the banks into the sample audit committee has a number of (external and internal) for 4 
people, while the minimum value of sizedit at 3.00 means that there is a bank which has 3 
members of the audit committee . While the maximum number of bank sizedit a sample of 6.00 
means that there is a bank that has a number of audit committee members as much as 6 people . 
6. Average AC2 as measured using the proportion of independent audit committee is of 0.5 means the 
number of independent audits compared to the number of members of the audit committee as a 
whole has the same proportions. While the minimum value is equal to 0.667 means the sum of 
independent audit committee members compared to the number of members of the audit 
committee as a whole has a smaller proportion or fewer. While the maximum value of 0.75 means 
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the number of independent audit committee members as compared to the number of members of 
the audit committee as a whole has almost the same proportion. 
7. Average AC3 as measured by using the number of audit committee meetings are as many as 13 
meetings in a year, while meeting minimum is 2 times in a year while the maximum value is for as 
much as 16 times more than is required by the government. 
8. Average AC4 as measured using the experience of audit committee members worked as an auditor 
is by 12:33 it means that the average member of the audit committee have accounting education 
background is 1/3 of the total number of members of the audit committee. 
9. The minimum value is 0% means that no member of the audit committee of the bank that has the 
educational background of accounting. The maximum value is 0.667, which means that the 
number of audit committee members who have educational backgrounds accounting are 70% of 
the total number of members of the audit committee. 
10. AC average 5 are measured using the educational background of the audit committee is at 33% 
meaning that the average member of the audit committee who has experience as an auditor is one 
third of the total number of members of the audit committee.While the minimum value is 0% 
means that no member of the audit committee of the bank who has experience as an auditor. The 
maximum value is 0.667 means that the number of audit committee members who have 
experience as an auditor 70 % of the total number of members of the audit committee. 
11. Average AQ1 is measured using a dummy the size of the Public Accounting Firm conduct an audit 
of the banks into the sample amounted to 0.70 means that most of the banks are being sampled in 
this study in audits by the Big Four accounting firm and part smaller audited by non Big Four 
accounting firm. 
12. The average AQ2 as measured using the audit opinion dummy is equal 0.60 meaning that most of 
the banks are to be sampled in this study obtain audit opinion "unqualified" of the external auditor. 
4.1. Stages and Testing Results 
1. Overall Suitability Model. Structural model in SEM analysis begins with testing the overall model 
goodness of fit is statistics from LISREL output (Hair et al., 1995). Overall summary of the critical 
value of the test match the overall model can be seen from the summary in Table 2 (attached).By 
looking at the overall results of estimation based on existing criteria, the overall values obtained are 
marginal. Therefore, from the above analysis to test the reliability of the overall model output is at 
marginal fit. 
2. Compatibility of Measurement Model. To test the measurement model fit performed on each 
construct separately through the evaluation of the construct validity and reliability (Wijanto, 2006). 
The aim of this testing phase to ensure that the constructs used in this study met the criteria valid 
and reliable. The validity and reliability of each construct of the observed variables are shown in 
Table 3 (attached).Based on the data in the table it can be concluded that the standard factor loading 
of each observed variable is greater than 0.70 then the validity of each variable is good.  
3. Compatibility of Structural Model. This analysis was conducted on the structural equation 
coefficients by specifying a certain level of significance. Analysis of the structural models test the 
hypotheses proposed in this study. For a significance level of 0.05, the value t of structural equation 
must be greater or equal to 1.96 or greater for a practical equal to 2 (Wijanto, 2008). 
 
4.2. Structural Equation Models (SEM): 
To prove H1, H2, and H3 are as follows: 
BP= 0.56*BC + 0.033*AC + 0.44*AQ,Errorvar.= 0.066 , R² = 0.93 
(0.13)   (0.100)     (0.10)         (0.057)            
 4.40        0.33        4.26             1.17              
 
All coefficients have significant values, except for the Audit Committee of the latent variables 
(AC). This equation is an equation for the first hypothesis, the second and third. It can be concluded 
that the hypothesis of this research (H1 and H3)  is proved significant. As for the H2 results is proved in 
significant. H2 cannot be proved from the descriptive statistics on the variables of audit committee 
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meetings. In addition ,of the results of this research shows that accounting education background and 
experience as an auditor does not have a significant impact on the performance of the audit committee 
on banking performance. To assess how well the coefficient of determination of the structural 
equation, it will be seen from the magnitude of R2(Wijanto, 2006). Lisrel test results that can be seen 
in the Reduced Form Equation R2 values obtained for structural equation in this study. R2 values in our 
model are equal to 0.93, which means that the model is able to explain 93% of the change in the latent 
variable Bank Performance. Overall value to f the three hypotheses proposed in this study results can 
be summarized inTable 2. 
 
4.3. Analysis of Testing Results 
Based on the structural equation model, confirming that the commissioners proved significantly 
positive effect on bank performance. What it means is the greater control by the board of 
commissioners on banking operations, the higher performance produced by banks. Results of this 
study reinforce the results of previous studies that Rosentein and Wyatt (1990), Dalton et al. (1999), 
Nasution and Setiawan (2007). 
 
Table2. T-Value forEachHypothesis 
Hyp Path  Estimation t-value Conclusion 
1 BCBP 0.56 4.40 Significant 
2 ACBP 0.033 0.33 Not Significant 
3 AQBP 0.44 4.26 Significant 
 
The followingpath diagram shows thestructuralmodelofLisrel 
 
Fig. 2 SEM Diagram 
 
The second hypothesis, which examined the effect of audit committee on banking performance  
results was not proven. These results are not in accordance with the results of previous studies 
(Herwidayatmo, 2000; Xie et al., 2003), although the direction (sign) is generated to support the 
results of these studies. This can be explained that the bank has a number of audit committee members 
very much and exceed the requirements stipulated by Bank Indonesia and Bapepam. There are also 
banks that conduct the audit committee meetings or gatherings up to 16 times in one year and it 
exceeded the meetings required by the governance. 
The third hypothesis tested the effect of audit quality on bank performance results also proved 
positive and significant influence. It means that the greater a bank audit quality, the better the 
performance generated by the bank. These results reinforce the results of previous studies such as the 
study Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Watts and Zimmerman (1986). 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This research is supported by numerous previous studies conducted related to the effect of the 
application of corporate governance on bank performance. The purpose of this study is to see how far 
the application of corporate governance can be good or bad effect on bank performance. This model 
uses the data of 30 banking companies. The results prove: 
1. Board of Commissioners has a positive effect on bank performance. The better performance of the 
board of commissioners, the better performance of the bank. 
2. The audit committee did not affect the performance of t he bank. Bank Indonesia and Bapepam can 
explain this from the bank that has a number of audit committee members that exceed the 
requirements stipulated. There are also banks that conduct the audit committee meetings or 
gatherings up to 16 times in one year and it exceeded the meetings required by the government. 
3. Quality audit has a positive effect on bank performance. The better performance of the board of 
commissioners, the better the performance of banks. 
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